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THE VISUAL AND THE LAW OF CITIES 
 
Stephen R. Miller* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
“Man only knows himself insofar as he knows the world—the 
world which he only comes to know in himself and himself only 
in it.”1–Goethe 
 
It is expected that law, whether religious or secular in 
origin, is a textual discipline, and that no matter what law’s 
subject, the legal discourse will be conducted in words, and that 
the meaning of law will depend upon textual interpretation.2 
There are several areas of law, however, that challenge that 
general supposition, and where the visual is as important as 
the text in framing the law and rendering legal decisions. 
Among those are the allied fields of law that deal with building, 
construction, architecture, planning, developing, preserving, 
and otherwise creating the places where we live. For lack of a 
better term, I will call these fields—sometimes individually 
referred to as land use law, real estate law, construction law, 
and so on—the law of cities. Admittedly, there is no law school 
class or practitioner treatise upon the law of cities, but it will 
be helpful, for purposes of this article, to have a shorthand to 
reference the multifarious collection of place-making laws. 
By law of cities, I also do not intend to limit the discussion 
to urban areas. Rather, “cities” is used here to connote the 
larger conception of such entities inclusive not only of their 
 
  * Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. B.A., 
Brown University. M.C.P., University of California, Berkeley. J.D., 
University of California, Hastings College of Law. 
1. RICHARD SENNETT, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE EYE: THE DESIGN AND 
SOCIAL LIFE OF CITIES vii (W.W. Norton & Co. 1992). 
2. See, e.g., John 1:1 (King James) (“In the beginning was the Word, and 
the Word was with God, and the Word was God.”); see generally ANTONIN 
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS (2012). 
1
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urban areas, but also suburbs, adjacent new towns, rural towns 
and hamlets, and the hinterlands of cities. As such, the law of 
cities, as used in this article, is intended to address the entirety 
of the possibility of settlements, excluding only those areas of 
wilderness either intentionally set aside or otherwise not 
exploited by human endeavor.3 
This article will attempt to explore, through four separate 
“tableaux,” or brief sketches, four ways in which the visual 
interplays with the law of cities, and how a deeper 
understanding of this intersection can assist in the 
development of these laws and their underlying policies. This 
discussion will by no means be definitive. However, by 
presenting these four approaches in which the visual 
complicates and assists the law of cities, and sometimes even 
acts as the law of cities, it is hoped the article will spur a 
dialogue on the law’s relationship to the visual. 
First, the article explores the law’s longstanding adverse 
relationship to the visual, as well as general efforts to change 
that relationship. The article then turns to the four tableaux 
that explore the law of cities and the visual, each of which 
presents a different factual situation that explores how the 
visual relates to the law of cities. In the first tableau, the 
article discusses the question of the cultural value of a hand-
drawn map by reviewing the U.S. Supreme Court’s nineteenth 
century jurisprudence on Spanish-era diseños, or maps, which 
were part of Spanish and Mexican California land grants. In 
the second tableau, the article discusses the question of 
whether aesthetics is a proper domain of the law of cities by 
comparing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Berman v. 
Parker4 and its progeny with Daniel Burnham’s 1909 Plan of 
Chicago (the “Plan”),5 which was the first, and perhaps most 
 
3. Such a conception of cities is consistent with approaches to regional 
planning. For a visual representation of this approach, see, for example, 
Patrick Geddes, The Valley Section, SIR PATRICK GEDDES MEMORIAL TR., 
http://www.patrickgeddestrust.co.uk/valleysection.htm (last visited Oct. 9. 
2012). 
4. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
5. DANIEL H. BURNHAM & EDWARD H. BENNETT, PLAN OF CHICAGO: 
PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE COMMERCIAL CLUB DURING THE YEARS 
MCMVI, MCMVII, AND MCMVIII (Charles Moore ed.,1908) [hereinafter PLAN 
OF CHICAGO]. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/5
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important, comprehensive plan drafted for an American city in 
the “City Beautiful” tradition. The third tableau explores the 
production of space and the philosophy of Henri Lefebvre in the 
context of the visual as law, most notably, in the rise of visual 
zoning and building codes. The fourth tableau extends the law 
and literature movement to the visual arts through the 
philosophy of Edward Casey as applied to the work of painter 
Edward Hopper. Allied with the presentations of the third and 
fourth tableaux are questions of how legal and visual 
abstractions relate to and affect the individual. 
Like works of art that envelop their viewers, such as the 
medieval unicorn tapestries,6 a chapel of Rothkos,7 or a 
courthouse lobby of Ellsworth Kelly color-field paintings,8 these 
four tableaux seek to illustrate for the reader how the law of 
cities is deeply intertwined with the visual, and how its 
evolution and the fulfillment of its role in building cities is also 
inextricably intertwined with the visual. The article concludes 
by offering a forward-looking approach to the visual in the law 
of cities. 
 
II. The Canvas: Distrusting, Embracing the Visual 
 
“The best way to understand a legal concept is to analyze it the 
way a geologist looks at the landscape.”9–Gerald Frug 
 
For the last several hundred years, the most recognizable 
legal image has been that of Justitia, a blindfolded woman 
 
6. See The Unicorn Tapestries, METRO. MUSEUM OF ART, 
http://www.metmuseum.org/metmedia/interactives/adults-teachers/the-
unicorn-tapestries (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (describing series of seven 
tapestries hung together in the round and dating from 1495–1505 that 
collectively show hunt of unicorn). 
7. See About the Chapel, ROTHKO CHAPEL, 
http://www.rothkochapel.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=3&Itemid=31 (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (describing a Houston, Texas chapel 
built in 1961 hanging multiple Marc Rothko paintings in the round). 
8. See The Boston Panels, U. S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., 
http://www.gsa.gov/graphics/pbs/39_Ellsworth_Kelly.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 
2012) (describing 21 aluminum color-field paintings by artist Ellsworth Kelly 
hung in the round in Boston’s John Joseph Moakley U.S. Courthouse). 
9. Gerald Frug, A Legal History of Cities, in THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES 
READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE 154, 154 (Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 2001). 
3
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carrying scales.10 The image is intended to portray objectivity 
and impartiality. The implication, if only in metaphor, is that 
by purposefully restraining access to the visual, a tribunal is 
better served in objectively weighing the arguments of the 
parties before it. Of course, many of the other senses—hearing 
or touch, among them—are equally capable of conveying to an 
arbiter the identity or status of the person before the tribunal. 
As such, it is not simply the identity-masking nature of the 
blindfold that the metaphor seeks to implicate; rather, it is that 
the visual in its entirety is a sense not trusted with the legal 
enterprise.11 
One commentator has noted: 
 
Law, like most other disciplines or practices that 
aspire to rationality, has tended to identify that 
rationality (and hence its virtue) with texts 
rather than pictures, with reading words rather 
than “reading” pictures, to the point that it is 
often thought that thinking in words is the only 
 
10. Compare JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: 
INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC 
COURTROOMS (2011), with ARLO GUTHRIE, Alice’s Restaurant Massacre, on 
ALICE’S RESTAURANT (Reprise Records 1967). The song’s protagonist and Obie, 
his friend, accused of throwing trash over a cliff,  
 
stood up with the twenty seven eight-by-ten color, glossy 
pictures, and the judge walked in, sat down with a seeing 
eye dog, and he sat down; we sat down. Obie looked at the 
seeing eye dog, and then at the twenty seven eight-by-ten 
color, glossy pictures with circles and arrows and a 
paragraph on the back of each one, and looked at the seeing 
eye dog. And then at twenty seven eight-by-ten color, glossy 
pictures with circles and arrows and a paragraph on the 
back of each one and began to cry, ’cause Obie came to the 
realization that it was a typical case of American blind 
justice. 
 
GUTHRIE, supra. 
11. Taken literally, the metaphor clearly breaks down. A blindfolded 
judge would also be unable to review any written text, leaving the judge’s 
only access to knowledge about a case ostensibly obtained through hearing. 
Hearing, of course, is equally prejudicial, if the judge knows the voices of the 
advocates or the parties on trial. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/5
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kind of thinking there is.12 
 
Law’s efforts to rid itself of the visual are not sui generis; 
rather, it follows a long tradition in the Western intellectual 
tradition that eschews the ability of the visual to adequately 
convey truth. Consider, for instance, challenges to the visual 
such as George Berkeley’s “crooked oar” (is an oar that appears 
crooked when submerged half-way in the water truly bent?)13 
and modernist philosophers’ discussions of color (when we 
agree we see “red,” are we seeing the same thing?).14 
Many who have considered the use of the visual in law 
have challenged the use of images in law, arguing that visual 
images are not subject to the same stringent form of 
interpretation as words, and that visual images are easily 
manipulated.15 A commentator reviewing the use of visual 
media in U.S. Supreme Court decisions argues that the 
perceived “neutrality and accuracy” of visual attachments to 
decisions do not warrant “automatic deference.”16 For instance, 
a visual attachment in Capitol Square Review and Advisory 
Board v. Pinette was taken from a low angle, which made a ten-
foot Latin cross appear substantially taller than it is.17 
Similarly, maps in redistricting cases can make districts 
appear more unusual than they might to voters in those 
districts.18 As with any visual media, these attachments are 
 
12. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of 
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 689 (2012) (quoting NEAL FEIGENSON & 
CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY 4 (2009)). 
13. GEORGE BERKELEY, THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND 
PHILONOUS (1713), reprinted in THE WORKS OF GEORGE BERKELEY, BISHOP OF 
CLOYNE § 2:238 (A.A. Luce & T.E. Jessop eds. 1949); see also Lisa Downing, 
George Berkeley, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. (Jan. 19, 2011), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/berkeley. 
14. See Barry Maund, Color, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. (Sept. 18, 2006), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/color/ (describing history of 
debate on color arising with Descartes and Locke, and subsequent iterations 
of the debate). 
15. Hampton Dellinger, Words Are Enough: The Troublesome Use of 
Photographs, Maps, and Other Images in Supreme Court Opinions, 110 HARV. 
L. REV. 1704, 1707 (1997). 
16. Id. 
17. 515 U.S. 753, 815 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Dellinger, supra 
note 15. 
18. See Dellinger, supra note 15. 
5
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influenced by color, angle, size, perspective, and the choice of 
cropping that is always present in a visual representation.19 
While the Court continues to use the visual in its 
decisions,20 it is likely that such fears described above, not to 
mention tradition, encourage the Court to prioritize text-based 
descriptions over visual attachments. For instance, in the 
recent U.S Supreme Court case of PPL Montana, LLC v. 
Montana,21 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion utilized over 
1,500 words and twenty-nine source citations to describe the 
course of three rivers at issue in the case, but utilized no maps 
whatsoever.22 The State of Montana, in its briefing of the case, 
provided a detailed map that clearly denoted the course of the 
three rivers in a single image.23 Interestingly, the dominant 
legal search engine, Westlaw, stripped the appended images 
from its HTML version of the State of Montana’s briefing,24 
which implicates a more practical reason for not using the 
visual in legal decisions: technical issues with reproducing such 
images. 
The visual raises other practical legal issues. For instance, 
Google recently settled litigation for its Book Search function 
with all of the text providers but determined that addressing 
the copyright of images would be too difficult, and so the 
images of such scanned books are being removed.25 
Perhaps the best place to look for how the law addresses 
the visual is not the legal system’s high court, but rather in the 
trial courts that do the dirty work of gathering evidence. There, 
the story of the visual is more complex. Prior to the 1850s, legal 
evidence usually consisted of words: spoken testimony, written 
depositions, contracts, deeds, and similar instruments.26 
 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 1705 (listing Supreme Court cases with images in their 
opinions). 
21. 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012). 
22. See id. at 1221-25. 
23. Brief for Respondent at Appendix 1a, PPL Montana, LLC v. 
Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012) (No. 10-218), 2010 WL 5126226. 
24. See id. Westlaw’s PDF version of the filing does display the maps, 
however. 
25. Tushnet, supra note 12, at 685. 
26. Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence 
and the Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 5 (1998). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/5
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Images in court were usually those that were already 
authorized legal documents, such as county-approved maps, 
surveys in land dispute cases, or drawings and diagrams in 
patent cases. 27 As one commentator described it: 
 
When unofficial drawings were used, they were 
not thought to be evidence. Only with the advent 
of photography were these broader kinds of 
visual representations conceptualized as 
evidence, their evidentiary value deemed 
significant enough to be fought over, their 
improper inclusion or exclusion deemed worthy 
grounds for appeal. Indeed, by the end of the 
century, the use of visual evidence had 
blossomed, and images of many sorts, from 
photographs to diagrams to three-dimensional 
models, were frequently used in an effort to 
persuade the jury. Visual representation, not 
limited to photography, had become a significant 
persuasive technique in the courtroom. 28 
 
Photographs opened the door to what came to be called 
“demonstrative evidence,” and in our current image-saturated 
culture, the strain of how to handle the increasing body of 
visual evidence is palpable. 
In response to this strain, some commentators have argued 
that a new “visual legal realism” is needed, recognizing that 
“[a]s goes popular discourse, so goes legal rhetoric.”29 Images 
have never been so easy and cheap to produce, and so easily 
distributed as they are today. If Marshal McLuhan was right, 
and the “medium is the message,”30 these commentators argue, 
then the law must accept the ready prevalence of such images 
and its influence on the rhetoric of the day. 31 Already, the 
 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Richard K. Sherwin, A Manifesto for Visual Legal Realism, 40 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 719, 724 (2007). 
30. See generally MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE 
EXTENSIONS OF MAN (1964). 
31. See Richard K. Sherwin et. al, Law in the Digital Age: How Visual 
7
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practice of law itself, especially at the trial level, is saturated 
with images, and courtrooms don the latest technologies for 
electronic projection of visual evidence.32 According to some 
commentators, the reason is obvious: 
 
[R]adical shifts in the technology of 
communication alter our mind as well as our 
culture. For example, unlike words on the page, 
visual images on the screen are far more likely to 
directly stimulate heightened emotional 
responses. Viewers tend to react to screen images 
in the same way that they react to reality. Naive 
realism apparently is the natural default setting 
for visual common sense. Subject to our 
unthinking gaze, which is mostly how we watch, 
the screen seems to present a window onto 
reality. We tend to look through the medium 
rather than at it. Moreover, once we comprehend 
what we see, that’s usually all we need to believe 
it. In other words, the familiar commonplace that 
“seeing is believing” is not just idle folk 
knowledge—not that there is anything “idle” 
about folk knowledge. Indeed, such knowledge is 
a major source not only of mental content but 
also of the cognitive tools most people use most of 
the time.33 
 
This increasing use of the visual in the legal profession, 
even in its core judicial setting, will require more advanced 
thought on how the visual is used in the legal profession in a 
time when visual images proliferate, and are considered an 
expected part of discourse.34 For purposes of this article, this 
 
Communication Technologies are Transforming the Practice, Theory, and 
Teaching of Law, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 227, 241-45 (2006) (listing 
varieties of visual media used in courts and studies on effectiveness of visual 
communication). 
32. Sherwin, supra note 29, at 727. 
33. Id. at 725-26. 
34. Id. at 731 (offering four “rules of thumb” for how to think about how 
the visual shapes legal decision-making: “(1) simplify the complex; (2) exploit 
the iconic; (3) emulate generic fictions (to produce the truth); and (4) respect 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/5
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review of the visual in law generally provides the foundation 
from which to consider several instances of how the visual 
operates in the law of cities. Similar to law generally, the law of 
cities evinces a range of reactions to the visual, and the context 
in which the visual appears is as important as any bright-line 
rule. 
 
III. First Tableau: Diseños and the Value of a Hand-Drawn 
Map 
 
“It is not down in any map; true places never are.”35–Herman 
Melville 
 
This tableau addresses the relationship between the visual 
and the law’s overarching need for specificity, and how diseños, 
or maps, attached to Spanish California land grants express 
the cultural specificity of such requirements. 
More than the law generally, the law of cities has 
embraced the visual. As noted previously, even when courts 
historically only took evidence in a textual form, they often 
made exceptions for maps and surveys that assisted the court 
in adjudicating a case involving land.36 The law of cities’ 
inclusion of the visual remains to this day. In many cities and 
counties, a zoning map is the legal means of delineating zoning 
district boundaries,37 and where there is disagreement as to 
permitted uses between text in the zoning code or enabling 
ordinance and the zoning map, the zoning map generally 
controls.38 For instance, in Coastal Property Associates, Inc. v. 
Town of St. George, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held 
that the zoning map’s enabling ordinance “text is merely 
illustrative and was included to make it easier to locate the 
districts generally on the Map, and that one has to refer to the 
 
the medium”). 
35. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK, OR, THE WHALE 57 (Univ. of Cali. 
Press 1981) (1851). 
36. Mnookin, supra note 26. 
37. See generally 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9:3 
(5th ed. 2012); 1 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING 
AND PLANNING § 10:13 (4th ed. 2012) [hereinafter RATHKOPF]. 
38. See generally RATHKOPF, supra note 37. 
9
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Map itself to identify a district’s precise borders.”39 It is the 
filing and acceptance of a subdivision map that legally 
subdivides a property into lots in most jurisdictions.40 At 
common law, the act of filing for record a map of property 
showing lots separated by defined areas named as streets 
constitutes an offer to dedicate the street to public use.41 
Condominium plans requirements include a “description or 
survey map” showing monumentation, a three-dimension 
description of “sufficient detail” to identify the common areas 
and each separate interest.42 Flood maps, created by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”), determine 
applicability of the federal government’s flood insurance 
programs.43 A condemning agency that draws a line delineating 
a potential future condemnation is liable for pre-condemnation 
damages where there is “unreasonable delay” in the 
condemnation.44 In transfer of development rights schemes, it 
is the map that delineates the “sending” and “receiving” 
areas.45 
 
39. 601 A.2d 89, 90 (Me. 1992). 
40. See Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 83 Cal. 
Rptr. 740, 742 (Ct. App. 1970) ("The recording of a final tract map for a 
normal subdivision automatically converts what was formerly a single parcel 
into as many separate lots as appear on the tract map."). See generally 9 
HENRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, MILLER & STARR CALIFORNIA REAL 
ESTATE § 25:61 (3d ed. 2012). 
41. See Wright v. City of Morro Bay, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719, 722 (Ct. App. 
2006) (citing S.F. Sulphur Co. v. Contra Costa Cnty., 276 P. 570, 372 (1929); 
Eltinge v. Santos, 152 P. 915, 917 (1915); Niles v. City of Los Angeles, 58 P. 
190, 192 (1899)). 
42. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1351(e) (West 2012). 
43. See Map Service Center, FED. EMER. MGMT. AGENCY, 
https://msc.fema.gov/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/FemaWelcomeView?storeId=1
0001&catalogId=10001&langId=-1 (last visited Oct. 9, 2012). 
44. Klopping v. City of Whittier, 500 P.2d 1345, 1356 (1972); see also 11 
MILLER & STARR, supra note 40, § 30:19. These cases are highly fact 
dependent. For instance, in Smith v. California, 123 Cal. Rptr. 745 (Ct. App. 
1975), the court held on other facts that it was not unreasonable to announce 
plans for a proposed freeway as far as 15 years in advance in view of the 
necessity for hearings, environmental studies, and the other required 
processes. 
45. E.g., BOULDER CNTY., COLO., LAND USE CODE § 6-700(b) (2011), 
available at 
http://www.bouldercounty.org/find/library/build/lucodearticle06.pdf (“The 
sending sites to be preserved and protected through the application of this 
article are those designated on the Boulder County TDR Sending Sites Map, 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/5
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While the law of cities accepts these visual documents into 
law, the question of how far to extend such limits with the 
visual varies over time, between communities, and even 
cultures. There may be no more evocative set of cases to 
illustrate how the most basic manner in which the visual can 
be culturally determined than those the U.S. Supreme Court 
faced when trying to determine the validity and perfection of 
Spanish and Mexican land claims in pre-conquest California. 
The Spanish government controlled California prior to 
1821.46 The Mexican government controlled California from 
1821 to 1846,47 when it was seized and controlled by the United 
States48 until the latter formally acquired 525,000 square miles 
of Mexican territory, including California, from Mexico in 1848 
under the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement 
with the Republic of Mexico,49 commonly referred to as the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (“Treaty”).50 Under the Treaty, 
Mexico received fifteen million dollars in compensation for the 
territory.51 Section Ten of the Treaty originally provided for 
protection of land grants previously made by the Spanish and 
Mexican governments; however, the U.S. Senate deleted that 
section before ratifying the Treaty, as many Americans 
believed that the land grants constituted the most valuable 
land in California.52 
 
the Niwot Sending and Receiving Area Map, and areas designated through 
Intergovernmental Agreements with municipalities in Boulder County.”). 
46. Myra K. Saunders, California Legal History: A Review of Spanish 
and Mexican Legal Institutions, 87 LAW LIBR. J. 487, 488 (1995). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement with the 
Republic of Mexico, U.S.-Mex., Jul. 4, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=009/llsl009.db&recNum=975. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. William Benemann, Nine Treasures: California Legal History 
Research in the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 6 CAL. 
LEGAL HIST. 251, 258 (2011). All of the approximately 1,400 diseños filed 
under the California Land Act are now kept at the University of California, 
Berkeley’s Bancroft Library. See Calisphere, UNIV. OF CAL., 
http://www.calisphere.universityofcalifornia.edu/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) 
for copies of a substantial number of the diseños, which may be accessed by 
searching “diseno.” 
11
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Seeking a middle-ground between expropriation of all 
claims and gaining access to the new state’s riches, the U.S. 
Congress passed An Act to Ascertain and Settle the Private 
Land Claims in the State of California (“Act”).53 The Act was 
intended to adjudicate pre-existing property rights claims 
arising from the Spanish and Mexican governments in 
California, which totaled between twelve and thirteen million 
acres of prime coastal and valley land, most of which were 
intended to convince settlement of distant lands, and most of 
which operated as cattle ranchos.54 The Act provided a review 
mechanism whereby any person claiming land grants from the 
Spanish or Mexican governments was to present a claim to an 
appointed board of commissioners who assembled all evidence 
of such claims.55 If the commissioners verified a claim, the 
United States could appeal to the federal district court, and if 
the district court upheld the commissioners’ ruling, the United 
States could appeal directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.56 For 
land claims that were confirmed and survived appeal, the 
United States issued a patent57 that established conclusive 
ownership between the United States and the claimants, but 
not as against third parties.58 The Act provided claimants two 
years after the date of the Act to present claims to the 
commissioners for consideration; and that all other lands not so 
claimed would be “considered as part of the public domain of 
the United States.”59 
In review of such claims, the United States Supreme Court 
early announced in U.S. v. Cambuston60 the requirements for 
perfecting a pre-existing Mexican land claim that would be 
recognized under the Act. These requirements included 
meeting all of the criteria for establishing a land grant under 
 
53. Ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631 (1851) [hereinafter California Land Act]. 
54. Karen B. Clay, Property Rights and Institutions: Congress and the 
California Land Act of 1851, 59 J. OF ECON. HIST. 122, 122-23 (1999). 
55. California Land Act § 8, 9 Stat. at 632. 
56. Id. §§ 9-10, 9 Stat. at 632-33. 
57. Id. § 13, 9 Stat. at 633. 
58. Id. § 15, 9 Stat. at 634. 
59. See Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. 478 (1865) (describing procedures under 
the California Land Act). 
60. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 59 (1857). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/5
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Spanish or Mexican rule.61 If the Mexican Governor decided to 
grant the land, the diseño was included in a document called 
an expediente, which granted title to the land in the diseño.62 
 
61. Id. at 62.  
 
The regulations for the colonization of the Territories of the 
Government of Mexico, made 21st November, 1828, in 
pursuance of the act of the General Congress, August 18, 
1824, provided: 1st. That the Governors of the Territories 
should be empowered to grant vacant lands, among others, 
to private persons who may ask for them, for the purpose of 
cultivating and inhabiting the same. 2d. That every person 
soliciting lands shall address to the Governor a petition, 
expressing his name, country, and religion, and describing 
as distinctly as possible, by means of a map [called a 
diseño], the land asked for. 3d. The Governor shall proceed 
to obtain the necessary information, whether the petition 
contains the proper conditions required by the law of the 
18th August, 1824, both as regards the land and the 
petitioner, in order that the application may be at once 
attended to; or, if it be preferred, the municipal authority 
may be consulted, whether there be any objection to the 
making of the grant. 4th. This being done, the Governor will 
accede or not to such petition, in conformity to the laws on 
the subject. 5th. The definitive grant asked for being made, 
a document signed by the Governor shall be given, to serve 
as a title to the party interested, wherein it must be stated 
that the grant is made in exact conformity with the 
provisions of the law in virtue of which possession shall be 
given. 6th. The necessary record shall be kept, in a book 
provided for the purpose, of all the petitions presented and 
grants made, with maps of the lands granted, and a 
circumstantial report shall be forwarded quarterly to the 
Supreme Government. 
 
Id.; see also United States v. Castillero, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 17 (1862) 
(describing same). 
62. See United States v. Galbraith, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 394, 399 (1862) (“A 
diseño or map is a necessary part of every land espediente [sic], and is 
distinctly required by the regulations of 1828.”). The Court was not always 
consistent in its understanding of what right the expediente granted. In 
United States v. Elder, 177 U.S. 104 (1900), the Court collected its partially 
contradictory holdings on the role of the expediente. The most technically 
precise definition of an expediente was in United States v. Knight's 
Administrator, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 227, 245-46 (1861), which stated,  
 
When complete, an espediente [sic] usually consists of the 
petition, with the diseño annexed; a marginal decree, 
approving the petition; the order of reference to the proper 
13
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Diseños were typically hand-drawn, and sketched out the land 
grant in reference to mountains, rivers, beaches, and other 
natural monuments. The diseño was rarely surveyed, and 
where it was, the Spanish and Mexican method for doing so 
could not yield a replicable result. Tradition called for two men 
on horseback to: 
 
[T]ake a lariat that was fifty varas in length 
(about 137.5 feet). One man would begin at a 
stated landmark - the old oak tree at the edge of 
the dry creek, the big red rock at the top of the 
third hill - and drive in a stake. The second 
horseman would ride until the lariat was drawn 
tight, and drive in another stake. The procedure 
would then be repeated. If the lariat was drawn 
through wet grass, it might be stretched and 
lengthened, or on a hot day, dried and 
contracted. As a result, no two surveys of the 
same area ever matched, and descriptions of the 
land were frequently so vague that it was not 
clear what should be measured in the first 
place.63 
 
While the lariat and the diseño were sufficient to claim 
land under the Mexican regime, both means of surveying 
property looked amateurish, even silly, to the American court. 
By the time the diseño cases landed before the Supreme Court, 
the United States had nearly three-quarters of a century 
invested in a technical system for surveying and conveying 
 
officer, for information; the report of that officer, in 
conformity to the order, the decree of concession, and the 
copy or a duplicate of the grant. These several papers-that 
is, the petition, with the diseño annexed, the order of 
reference, the informé, the decree of concession, and the 
copy of the grant, appended together in the order 
mentioned-constitute a complete espediente [sic], within the 
meaning of the Mexican law.  
 
Id. Note that an “expediente” was also sometimes referred to in the Court’s 
cases as an “espediente,” which refers to the same document. 
63. Benemann, supra note 52, at 259. 
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land. While the Mexican government gave away lands in 
California subject to privately drawn diseños, the American 
system called for surveying land prior to settlement,64 and all 
sales or dispositions of public lands to private parties by the 
federal government were to be conducted in accordance with 
that survey system.65 The Public Land Survey System 
(“PLSS”), which is currently in use in most states with the 
exclusion of the original thirteen colony states and Texas, was 
originally proposed by Thomas Jefferson.66 The Land 
Ordinance of 178567 provided for the systematic survey of 
public domain lands and the Northwest Ordinance of 178768 
established a rectangular survey system. The resulting PLSS 
system divided land into six-mile-square townships, each of 
which are subdivided into thirty-six one-mile-square sections. 
Sections, in turn, can be further subdivided into quarter 
sections, quarter-quarter sections, or irregular government 
lots. The survey system is maintained through placement of a 
series of markers called “monumentation.”69 
Mexican claimants seeking to validate California land 
grants with hand drawn diseños were met with skepticism of 
the courts of their conquerors more accustomed to such 
technical surveys. While the American courts ostensibly gave 
the same weight to the validity of the diseños as the Mexican 
Governor would have done, it is clear the U.S. Supreme Court 
found this difficult to do in over seventy cases the Court heard 
 
64. The Public Land Survey System (PLSS), NAT’L ATLAS OF THE U.S., 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
http://www.nationalatlas.gov/articles/boundaries/a_plss.html (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Public Land Survey System]. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. An Ordinance for Ascertaining the Mode of Disposing of Lands in the 
Western Territory (May 18, 1785), in 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS 1774-1789 923 (Worthington C. Ford et al. eds., 1933), available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/bdsdcc:@field%28DOCID+@lit%28bdsdcc13201%29%29. 
68. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United 
States, North-West of the River Ohio (July 13, 1787), in 32 JOURNALS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789 334-43 (Worthington C. Ford et al. eds., 
1936), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/bdsdcc:@field%28DOCID+@lit%28bdsdcc22501%29%29. 
69. Public Land Survey System, supra note 64. 
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involving diseños. For instance, in De Arguello v. United 
States,70 a case adjudicating a diseño that claimed most of the 
San Francisco peninsula for the descendants of a commander of 
the San Francisco presidio, the Court refused to defer to the 
diseño.71 (See Figure 1). The Court expressed its frustration, 
stating, “[t]he appellants [who were challenging the diseño and 
the land claim] have got Las Pulgas,” the subject of the diseño, 
“by a valid title, according to the boundaries ascertained by the 
proper public authorities, and cannot now be permitted to recur 
to vague tradition of a vague and uncertain boundary, to 
unsettle the titles to a large territory since granted to others.”72 
In other words, the Court ruled for the party whose claim was 
established within the Court’s own cultural surveying scheme. 
To the eye of the Court, the hand-drawn diseño, with its 
sketched references to mountains, rivers, and beaches, was no 
match for the rigor of the more precise American survey 
system.73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Diseño del Las Pulgas74 
 
70. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 539 (1855). 
71. See id. at 546. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Calisphere, UNIV. OF CAL., 
http://content.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb3t1nb14h/?query=Rancho de las (last 
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The diseño casts into stark relief the stakes at issue in 
cultural relations to the visual in the law of cities: a map 
sufficient to convey vast swaths of coastal California in 
Mexican California conveyed no legal rights before an 
American court accustomed to a technically-accurate and 
scientifically-reproducible legal description. On the basis of 
ambiguity in a hand-drawn map, the Supreme Court dispensed 
with land claims to much of what became California’s most 
prosperous areas. This exhibits one way in which the cultural 
relationship to the visual in the law of cities manifests itself: 
while a map can be useful as a means of conveying land 
between parties, the value of the map is subject not only to the 
constitutional and statutory constraints upon such maps, but 
also the cultural and customary constraints upon what a map 
must do. While the rule of law typically prevents constitutional 
or statutory changes from eliminating legal rights provided by 
maps, larger cultural or customary changes, whether resulting 
from revolution, war, or otherwise, can upend the norms of how 
visual legal documents are interpreted and thus convey rights. 
 
IV. Second Tableau: Aesthetics and Burnham’s 1909 Plan of 
Chicago 
 
This tableau explores the changing relationship between 
the aesthetics, or the beauty of the built environment, and the 
law of cities. At the heart of this issue lies two questions: first, 
the extent to which law ought to regulate development to 
achieve a perceived beauty; and second, whether implicit in 
regulating beauty is a policy favoring the common good, 
property values, an elitist gentility, business, racism, all of the 
above, or something more? 
The English legal system had to tackle these aesthetic 
questions, eventually embedding them in the American legal 
inheritance. One prominent example is the role of enclosure 
laws in England and the accompanying rise of the picturesque 
as an artistic movement. In England, beginning in the 
sixteenth century and through to the nineteenth century, a 
series of enclosure laws eliminated rural commons areas, 
 
visited Dec. 21, 2012). 
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typically used for grazing or growing hay, and instead 
“enclosed” them in private property estates owned by elites and 
maintained after enclosure solely for the private uses of those 
elites.75 
The landscape architect Humphry Repton was particularly 
skilled at using the enclosure acts to achieve the ideal of the 
“picturesque” in landscape design.76 Repton, and others, in 
seeking to render the picturesque upon the land, sought to re-
create within the newly enclosed estate the “natural” landscape 
of the commons that previously existed. The result was an 
effort to maintain, through the artifice of the picturesque, the 
visual imagery of the previously open commons, but within the 
regularized, and private, spaces of the estate.77 In this 
application, the picturesque helped to mask—at least to the 
elites and perhaps to the society at large—the underlying legal 
changes under way in the countryside. The artifice did so by 
recreating the feeling previously elicited by the commons and 
thus normalizing the dramatic assertion of rights over rural 
land by the elites. 
In twentieth-century American culture, aesthetics in the 
law of cities evolved along several lines, including such 
disparate subjects as billboard regulation, project design 
review, and historic preservation.78 This article focuses on a 
 
75. See generally John Macarthur, Visual Appropriation and Property in 
the Theory of Humphry Repton, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF LAW: LANDSCAPE, 
IDENTITY AND REGULATION 49, 49-65 (William Taylor ed., 2006). 
76. See id. at 50. 
77. Simon Ryan, Picturesque Visions, in THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES 
READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE, supra note 9, at 143, 143. 
78. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 
129 (1978).  
 
Because this Court has recognized, in a number of settings, 
that States and cities may enact land-use restrictions or 
controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the 
character and desirable aesthetic features of a city 
appellants do not contest that New York City's objective of 
preserving structures and areas with special historic, 
architectural, or cultural significance is an entirely 
permissible governmental goal.  
 
Id. (citations omitted); Highway Beautification Act of 1965, 23 U.S.C. § 131 
(2012) (controls outdoor advertising along 306,000 miles of Federal-Aid 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/5
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series of questions that center around whether a city may raze 
a section of town deemed undesirable or, in the parlance of 
mid-century redevelopment, “blighted.” Is removal of a 
community whose primary offense is its visual appearance a 
legitimate concern of the law of cities?79 
In this case, we will start with the answer, because it is so 
prominent in the evolution of the law of cities. Like many mid-
century cities, the District of Columbia sought to condemn and 
raze a largely African-American community that it deemed 
“blighted”80 in order to build a new community that, it turned 
out, would become largely inhabited by white residents.81 The 
District of Columbia did have evidence of physical 
deterioration—a number of the buildings lacked indoor toilets, 
and there were a number of other indices of poverty—but there 
were also plenty other buildings in the wrecking ball’s way that 
were home to upstanding and profitable businesses.82 Just such 
a business was the source of review in the 1954 U.S. Supreme 
Court case of Berman v. Parker.83 In that case, the Court held 
that the District of Columbia could use its eminent domain 
powers to condemn not only the dilapidated properties, but also 
those well-functioning buildings in proximity to the blighted 
area.84 Further, the Court held: 
 
 
Primary, Interstate and National Highway System roads). 
79. Admittedly, blight determinations technically turned on non-visual 
determinations. However, the rationale for blight determinations is often a 
formality by which to grade how a place looks to those who do not live there. 
80. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954). 
81. Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of Berman v. Parker, 42 
URB. LAW. 423, 467 (2010). 
82. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 30-31; Lavine, supra note 81, at 444.  
 
Out of the entire 550 acre area, 43% of the residences had 
only outhouses, 44% did not have showers or baths, 70% 
had no central heating, and 21% did not have electricity. 
But while its physical attributes may have been lacking, 
Southwest was home to about 23,000 residents, and it 
provided a lively cultural hub for many of the city’s black 
residents and immigrant Jews. 
 
Lavine, supra note 81, at 444. 
83. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 31. 
84. See id. at 34-35. 
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The concept of the public welfare is broad and 
inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual 
as well as physical, aesthetic as well as 
monetary. It is within the power of the 
legislature to determine that the community 
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious 
as well as clean, well-balanced as well as 
carefully patrolled. In the present case, the 
Congress and its authorized agencies have made 
determinations that take into account a wide 
variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise 
them. If those who govern the District of 
Columbia decide that the Nation’s Capital should 
be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing 
in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the 
way.85 
 
The idea that the public welfare, and moreover the police 
power, includes within it the potential for aesthetic regulation 
was buttressed by subsequent decisions of the Court. For 
instance, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,86 the Court noted: 
 
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, 
and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate 
guidelines in a land-use project addressed to 
family needs. . . . The police power is not confined 
to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy 
places. It is ample to lay out zones where family 
values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet 
seclusion and clean air make the area a 
sanctuary for people.87 
 
In City of Memphis v. Greene,88 the Court noted, “[t]he 
residential interest in comparative tranquility is also 
 
85. Id. at 33 (citations omitted). 
86. 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (affirming an ordinance limiting single-family 
dwellings to families of not more than two unrelated residents). 
87. Id. at 9. 
88. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981). 
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unquestionably legitimate. That interest provides support . . . 
for the accepted view that a man’s home is his castle.”89 
Through these and other cases, the Court established that 
aesthetics was within the ambit of police power regulations and 
a proper subject for condemnation. 
With the clarity of the contemporary approach to 
aesthetics established, it is worth returning to perhaps the 
most important planning document of the twentieth century to 
address aesthetics, the 1909 Plan90 prepared for an 
organization of private city boosters, The Commercial Club, by 
Daniel Burnham of “make no little plans” fame,91 and architect 
Edward Bennet. Perhaps more than any other American 
document before or after, the Plan was intent on finding a way 
to build a beautiful city. In fact, the movement it launched 
across the United States was often referred to by the moniker 
“City Beautiful,” with its impetus to civic leaders, as well as 
businesses and other private parties, to do their parts to 
beautify American cities.92 
The concept of city planning was in its infancy when the 
Plan was set forth; the City of Chicago had no planning 
department or staff, and the document itself tells us that plan 
was the result of “disinterested men of wide experience,” most 
of which were leaders in the business community, and was 
drafted over thirty months.93 The City Beautiful movement, 
which became closely allied to both the Plan and Burnham 
personally, stated a “prosperity gospel”94 for bringing 
aesthetics—beauty—to city form. Burnham wrote: 
 
 
89. Id. at 127. 
90. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 5. 
91. It is arguable whether Burnham ever actually uttered the words for 
which he is posthumously famous. See THOMAS S. HINES, BURNHAM OF 
CHICAGO: ARCHITECT AND PLANNER 401 n.8 (2d ed. 2009) (1974). 
92. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 5, at 8. 
93. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 5, at 2. 
94. The idea largely holds that God blesses those favored with material 
wealth. Compare Cathleen Falsani, The Prosperity Gospel, WASH. POST, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/opinions/outlook/worst-
ideas/prosperity-gospel.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2012), with PLAN OF 
CHICAGO, supra note 5, at 4 (“[T]he city has a dignity to be maintained; and 
good order is essential to material advancement.”). 
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The experience of other cities both ancient and 
modern, both abroad and at home, teaches 
Chicago that the way to true greatness and 
continued prosperity lies in making the city 
convenient and healthful for the ever-increasing 
numbers of its citizens; that civic beauty satisfies 
a craving of human nature so deep and so 
compelling that people will travel far to find and 
enjoy it; that the orderly arrangement of the fine 
buildings and monuments brings fame and 
wealth to the city; and that the cities which truly 
exercise dominion rule by reason of their appeal 
to the higher emotions of the human mind. The 
problem for Chicago, therefore, resolves itself 
into making the best use of a situation, the 
central location and resources of which have 
already drawn together millions of people, and 
are clearly destined to assemble many times that 
number; and planning for that civic development 
which promotes present content and insures 
permanence.95 
 
As part of the aesthetic vision, Burnham spoke of the Plan as 
treating the city with a “comprehensive plan” that would 
address the city as an “organic whole,” a concept then new to 
American cities.96 The Plan states several factors that 
convinced these private civic leaders that they had to engage 
the idea of city planning.97 To achieve its goals, the proposal 
 
95. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 5, at 30. 
96. Id. at 28-29; see also id. at 121 (providing for visions of the 
improvement of the Lake front; the creation of a system of highways outside 
the city; the improvement of railway terminals, and the development of a 
complete traction system for both freight and passengers; the acquisition of 
an outer park system, and of parkway circuits; the systematic arrangement of 
the streets and avenues within the city, in order to facilitate the movement to 
and from the business district; and the development of centers of intellectual 
life and of civic administration, so related as to give coherence and unity to 
the city.). 
97. Id. at 14 (noting that “city planning, in the sense of regarding the 
city as an organic whole and of developing its various units with reference to 
their relations one to another,” had its origins in Paris and that Paris was the 
most accomplished in this art). 
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called for a wide array of public infrastructure projects, but 
perhaps none was as dramatic as an effort to cut through the 
city’s existing street forms and build large boulevards 
reminiscent of what Haussmann had accomplished in Paris, 
and which had been widely emulated in European cities.98 (See 
Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Plan of Chicago99 
 
The Plan was heavily influenced by Haussmann’s work in 
Paris, noting that “[t]he task which Haussmann accomplished 
for Paris corresponds with the work which must be done for 
Chicago, in order to overcome the intolerable conditions which 
invariably arise from a rapid growth of population.”100 If 
Haussmann could take Paris’s medieval core and turn it into a 
home for grand boulevards, then such plans were not beyond 
the reach of a can-do city like Chicago. 
 
 
98. Id. at 11-18. 
99. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 5, at 93. 
100. Id. at 18. 
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Similarly, the origins of the Plan could be traced to other 
standard bearers of civic beauty at the time. The Plan states 
that its origins “can be traced directly to the World’s 
Columbian Exposition” held in 1893,101 which brought to the 
city, if only in plaster-of-Paris casts, a vision and scale of 
grandeur that the post-fire Chicago of the late nineteenth-
century had not imagined possible. 
In addition, the city was facing staggering growth—during 
the second half of the nineteenth century, the population of 
Chicago increased from thirty thousand to two million102—and 
a grand plan seemed essential for practical purposes. That 
growth also led business leaders of Chicago to feel an air of 
inevitability about the city’s destiny for greatness. It was not 
good enough that the city should be wealthy, but they now also 
sought it to have the prestige of a world-class city.103 The Plan 
notes that the area of the Middle West that is the “domain over 
which Chicago holds primacy is larger than Austria-Hungary, 
or Germany or France;”104 and that expectations were such that 
in fifty years the city’s population will “be larger than London: 
that is, larger than any existing city.”105 To secure the city’s 
prominence befitting its size, the Plan implores the City’s 
business leaders that: 
 
 
 
101. Id. at 4. 
102. Id. at 32. 
103. See, e.g., id. at 34.  
 
It is not in the spirit of boasting that these facts are stated, 
but rather to show the responsibility which the very pre-
eminence of the city imposes, and the necessity for 
establishing and maintaining those standards of commercial 
integrity, of taste, and of knowledge which are the 
prerequisites of lasting success, and the only real 
satisfaction of the human mind. The constant struggle of 
civilization is to know and to attain the highest good; and 
the city which brings about the best conditions of life 
becomes the most prosperous. 
 
Id. 
104. Id. at 32. 
105. Id. at 33. 
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Conditions in Chicago are such as to repel 
outsiders and drive away those who are free to 
go. The cream of our own earnings should be 
spent here, while the city should become a 
magnet, drawing to us those who wish to enjoy 
life. The change would mean prosperity, 
effective, certain, and forever continuous.”106 
 
What was needed was something to draw those people to the 
City and that was a beautiful city. 
As much as the Plan was a visionary document, it was also 
practical. Foremost among the practical considerations were 
legal questions about how, under the American legal system, 
Chicago could build grand boulevards like Haussmann’s Paris, 
a feat which had been accomplished under the power of an 
emperor. Behind the eye-catching visual renderings of the 
Chicago that could be, the Plan also provided a detailed legal 
analysis of the powers necessary to bring the Plan to 
fruition.107 Walter F. Fisher, who later became U.S. Secretary 
of the Interior, drafted the legal analysis,108 which addressed in 
great detail the legal question of aesthetics. If a city were to 
make itself beautiful, and if that beauty required cutting 
through the fabric of the city as in Haussmann’s Paris, it would 
also mean condemning neighborhoods functioning fine now, but 
which were not in line with the larger, city-wide plan. With 
regard to condemnation to achieve the purposes of the Plan, 
Fisher noted: 
 
The police power is adequate to the destruction, 
without recompense, of single buildings which 
are insanitary or unsafe, but the legislature of 
Illinois has not yet undertaken to go further and 
license the condemnation by municipal 
authorities of congested or unwholesome areas 
under the power of eminent domain. . . . 
. . . It may be doubted, however, whether the 
 
106. Id. at 124. 
107. See generally id. at 125-54. 
108. Id. at 126. 
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courts would sustain as constitutional a statute 
designed to appropriate a whole congested area 
merely for the purpose of renovating it.109 
 
Fisher’s analysis, of course, came almost fifty years prior to 
Berman, and in considering almost identical factual situations, 
Fisher concluded that the law of aesthetics in his time did not 
clearly permit the wholesale removal of a community, the very 
such action approved in Berman.110 Now, a century later, and 
after Kelo v. City of New London,111 which affirmed Berman’s 
broad interpretation of the police power,112 it is remarkable to 
read such timidity toward aesthetic regulation in a document 
that is the basis of the City Beautiful movement. 
It must be remembered, however, that the Plan was 
written during a time that pre-dated most of the twentieth-
century planning apparatus—the Plan was more than a decade 
prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s blessing of zoning in the 
1925 case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company113 or 
the widespread adoption of Zoning Enabling Acts in the 
1920s.114 In fact, the legal analysis in the Plan states that it is 
unclear whether typical zoning requirements, much less design 
review requirements typical today, would be permitted at the 
time of the Plan: 
 
No question is made but that the city council has 
power to regulate the height of buildings with a 
view to health and public safety; but it may be 
doubted whether the police power would justify 
 
109. Id. at 151. 
110. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85. 
111. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
112. Id. at 501. 
113. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
114. For a historical background of such acts see Stuart Meck, Model 
Planning and Zoning Legislation: A Short History, in 1 AM. PLAN. ASS’N, 
MODERNIZING STATE PLANNING STATUTES: THE GROWING SMART WORKING 
PAPERS, 1, 1-4 (1996), available at 
http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/PAS462.pdf; and Ruth Knack et 
al., The Real Story Behind the Standard Planning and Zoning Acts of the 
1920s, 48 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (1996), available at 
http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/LULZDFeb96.pdf. 
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the municipal authorities in imposing more 
rigorous restrictions upon the character of 
buildings to be constructed along boulevards and 
around parks than in other parts of the city.115 
 
This passage of the Plan shows that its authors felt uncertain 
whether land use controls common today, such as those 
exercised by many design review boards over facades, could be 
legally sustained. The Plan’s legal reasoning on aesthetics is, in 
other words, as far as we can imagine from the post-Berman, 
and post-Kelo, reality where aesthetic regulations proliferate 
not only over the facades of buildings, but of transient 
structures like billboards. In its time, though, the Plan’s legal 
statement was merely a statement of the existing law. In this 
way, the Plan and Berman operate as bookends for a time 
when the law of cities was evolving in its approach to the 
regulation of beauty. 
If the Plan was one of America’s first planning document 
to prominently align itself with the import of making a city 
beautiful, it also exhibited a hesitancy, even a restraint, in its 
legal case for a city’s ability to engage in the type of activity it 
sought to engender. By the time of Berman, however, the Court 
was not only willing to offer a resounding legal defense of 
aesthetic regulation, but also willing to offer a defense to a 
city’s power to condemn functioning buildings in neighborhoods 
that were blighted.116 In just four decades, the law evolved to 
accept that building and protecting beautiful cities was a 
proper use of governmental power, even in democracies. 
Unresolved in the question of aesthetics regulation are the 
social implications of beautiful cities. While the Plan and the 
City Beautiful-era projects led to some of the most beloved 
public works projects in American history,117 post-Berman 
redevelopment projects led to innumerable examples of failed 
modernist buildings, bleak plazas, and disruptive street 
patterns.118 Aesthetic regulation, in other words, always has a 
 
115. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 5, at 141. 
116. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85. 
117. Examples of such projects include Chicago’s Michigan Avenue, 
Philadelphia’s Museum of Art, and San Francisco’s Civic Center. 
118. Examples of such projects include Albany’s Empire State Plaza, 
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social cost to those in the way of progress, but the result of 
aesthetic regulation is not always beauty. And thus the 
regulation of aesthetics through law establishes itself as 
something other than a philosophical inquiry into beauty’s 
origins and tastes. Instead, aesthetics in law has become first a 
tool to destructive power, and only with great labor does it 
create a city beautiful to both its inhabitants and creators. 
 
V. Third Tableau: Production of Space and Visual Codes 
 
“The user’s space is lived—not represented (or conceived).” 119 
–Henri Lefebvre 
 
This tableau explores a more theoretical approach to the 
law of cities and the visual: whether visual legal codes, such as 
those used in San Francisco’s new Treasure Island 
development plans, can answer a long-standing need of the law 
of cities to prioritize the perspective of the individual in the 
production of space. 
The legal codes that define the way cities evolve are bound 
by the intellectual traditions in which they arose. For Richard 
Sennett, these codes exist within a crossfire between the 
“Christian city,” which “put great value on the inside—on 
shelter within buildings as on inner experiences,” and the 
“Enlightenment city,” which “sought to take people outside—
but on to fields and forests rather than streets filled with 
jostling crowds.”120 Sennett defines the issue with this 
ideological division: 
 
In the face of larger differences in the city they 
tend to withdraw to the local, intimate, 
communal scale. Those who work visually and at 
a larger scale find it as difficult to organize 
diverse urban scenes. . . . The modern planner 
 
San Francisco’s Western Addition, and Fort Worth’s Tarrant County 
Convention Center. 
119. HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 362 (Donald Nicholson-
Smith trans., 1991) (1974). 
120. SENNETT, supra note 1, at 97. 
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lacks visual precepts for how races might be 
mixed in public places, or how to orchestrate the 
zoning and design of streets so that economically 
mixed uses work well. It is equally obscure how 
to design house projects and schools that mix 
races, classes, or ages. Human diversity seems 
something beyond the powers of human 
design.121 
 
For Sennett, the problem with the existing planning state is 
that its tools, such as traditional zoning, are ill-equipped to 
address or build a city with economic or racial diversity. Others 
have seen the dilemma of abstraction in codes planning for 
cities as inherent in the modern approach to law itself. Some 
have argued that the Western legal project is underwritten by 
an organized forgetting of the spaces and places of social life.122 
For such commentators, the English common law crafted by 
early modernists such as Edward Coke sought to create a 
unitary legal structure that, in its wake, denied and subjugated 
local laws that, in turn, reflected local communities.123 Another 
commentator noted that: 
 
When Blackstone instructed the teacher of 
English law to consider his course as “a general 
map of the law, marking out the shape of the 
country, its connexions and boundaries, its 
greater divisions and principal cities,” he also 
counseled that “it is not his business to describe 
minutely the subordinate limits, or to fix the 
longitude and latitude of every inconsiderable 
hamlet.” In so doing, he neatly expressed the 
tendency of law to erase spatial specificity and 
local difference in the name of an ordered and 
apparently coherent unity. In its very 
constitution, then, law appears to have an 
 
121. Id. at 97-98. 
122. Nicholas Blomley, From “What?” to “So What?”: Law and 
Geography in Retrospect, in 5 LAW AND GEOGRAPHY: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 
19, 25 (Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison eds., 2003). 
123. Id. 
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important, if negative, relation to space.124 
 
This underlying abstraction of modern law has significant 
ramifications for the law of cities, for if the creation of modern 
law has subjugated the specific to the general, then any effort 
in the law of cities to plan for a specific neighborhood or 
community must offer an alternative narrative to that of Coke 
and Blackstone. 
One approach to the local’s argument for place-based law 
arises in the law and geography movement. For instance, Nick 
Johnson and John Wightman have argued that the “where” of 
law is relevant in two ways: the “nexus between spatial 
location and the relevant persons is established in the law” and 
“where location can be seen to affect the content of the legal 
rights and duties.”125 In addition, they argue that there are 
three features of land that distinguish it from other things in 
which law recognizes property rights: (i) land remains, 
although structures on the land may be removed or replaced; 
(ii) the supply of land is fixed; and (iii) land is fixed in place, 
and thus “all land stands in a permanent spatial relationship 
to all other land.”126 The permanence and fixed supply of land 
impose a “stuckness” on the property owner, for while there is 
ostensibly a market for land, individuals are “stuck” to 
individual parcels to the extent they have invested financially 
in a business or residence, or to the extent that “rootedness” 
has developed in relationships to neighbors or networks of 
suppliers.127 It is these non-legal attachments that create 
“stuckness” as much as the law itself.128 In acknowledgment of 
this “stuckness,” the legal geographies movement seeks to open 
again the door, closed to local laws built on local knowledge, 
shut so long ago.129 Doing so “has the capacity to release law 
 
124. Id. 
125. Nick Johnson & John Wightman, Spatial Dimensions of Private 
Law, in 5 LAW AND GEOGRAPHY: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 122, at 35, 
36. 
126. See id. at 49. 
127. See id. 
128. Id. 
129. See Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison, Connecting Law and 
Geography, in 5 LAW AND GEOGRAPHY: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 122, 
at 3, 3 (“Context is everything. The conviction that law can properly be 
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from its (imposed and self-imposed) confinement as ‘word’ 
(interpretation, meaning, discourse) and to show ‘the legal at 
work in the world,’ a world dominates by the physical (places, 
landscapes, spatialities, natures).”130 
But perhaps no one has examined the question of how the 
abstractions of law affect the planning of cities more than the 
French philosopher Henri Lefebvre. Abstractions of law, to 
Lefebvre, are the tools that permit the creation of abstract 
spaces, spaces that deny an integrity to the local. Of such 
abstract space, Lefebvre has written, similar to Sennett, that it 
is a “tool of domination” that 
 
asphyxiates whatever is conceived within it and 
then strives to emerge. . . . This space is a lethal 
one which destroys the historical conditions that 
gave rise to it, its own (internal) differences, and 
any such differences that show signs of 
developing, in order to impose an abstract 
homogeneity.131 
 
Legal abstractions stifle not only diversity, but also the 
individual’s ability to be recognized in the planning process. 
 
understood only be reference to its place in, and relationship to, social, 
economic, political, and ecological systems underpins contemporary critical 
and socio-legal scholarship.”); id. at 4 (“[W]hereas the abstract application of 
legal doctrine and principles, and even the wholesale transplantation of a 
legal regime, might be viewed as unproblematic from a positivist perspective, 
a ‘Geography in Law’ approach suggest that law must make room for local 
conditions and experience, and recognize the changing of laws to work in local 
contexts. The identification here is with ‘local legal universes,’ or ‘legal 
localization’—forms of regulation rooted in local conditions of existence.”). 
130. Id. at 5; see also id. at 6 (“If space is a dominant currency of 
geography, then the boundaries of space are all-important, particularly when 
created or reinforced, by the concepts of law, such as jurisdiction, territory, 
and legality.”); Robert Mohr, Territory, Landscape and Law in Three Images 
of the Basque Country, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF LAW: LANDSCAPE, IDENTITY AND 
REGULATION, supra note 75, at 17, 29, available at 
http://works.bepress.com/rmohr/1/ (“Boundaries and how we draw them are 
fundamental to law and to a definition of law as jurisdiction. This analysis 
reminds us that those boundaries can be contested or refused, and may be 
unclear and overlapping. The boundaries can be seen to be less important 
than the spaces they purport to contain.”). 
131. LEFEBVRE, supra note 119, at 370. 
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The zoning map, for instance, uses perfect rationality to divide 
the city into a hierarchy of zones and uses without any 
perceived recognition of what exists in a place, or the 
individual’s desires for that place. 
This rise of abstract space, and abstraction’s laws, and its 
purpose, have a history132 that Lefebvre traces, in their 
European context, to codes that evolved out of the colloquial 
building styles of towns, each of which developed its own style 
of architecture.133 Imagine the small European town, where 
each house has its own name, perhaps a place like Queen 
Camel in the Somerset region of England, where instead of 
numbers, homes have names, such as “Caburn.” However, 
these local architectural codes were ultimately subsumed into 
larger, national codes, which stripped the locality of its 
autonomy and history, but gave the entirety of the region a 
greater sense of architectural unity and “charm.”134 Here we 
might imagine the rise of the six-floor apartment building 
along the boulevards in Haussmann’s Paris, and its ceaseless 
repetition throughout that city and throughout France and 
other European capitals. The deployment of such a spatial 
code, in Lefebvre’s view, 
 
is not simply a means of reading or interpreting 
space: rather it is a means of living in that space, 
of understanding it, and of producing it. As such 
it brings together verbal signs (words and 
sentences, along with the meaning invested in 
 
132. Id. at 44. 
 
If architects (and urban planners) do indeed have a 
representation of space, whence does it derive? Whose 
interests are served when it becomes ‘operational’? As to 
whether or not ‘inhabitants’ possess a representational 
space, if we arrive at an affirmative answer, we shall be 
well on the way to dispelling a curious misunderstanding 
(which is not to say that this misunderstanding will 
disappear in social and political practice). 
 
Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 47-48. 
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them by a signifying process) and non-verbal 
signs (music, sounds, evocations, architectural 
constructions).135 
 
Without that code of the apartment building, in other words, 
the culture of the boulevard would not have evolved, much less 
the culture of the café, the flaneur, or even the bourgeoisie. It is 
no surprise that the French student rebellion of 1968 built fires 
and road blocks on the boulevards, for those straight streets 
were the physical embodiment of a law of cities that prioritized 
the abstractions of a new world order over the individuals who 
were the neighborhood’s previous tenants. 
Beyond simply the codes of architecture, the law of cities 
further abstracted the growth of the city. Lefebvre writes: 
 
It was at this juncture that the idea of 
housing began to take on definition, along with 
its corollaries: minimal living-space, as 
quantified in terms of modular units and speed of 
access; likewise minimal facilities and a 
programmed environment. What was actually 
being defined here, by dint of successive 
approximations, was the lowest possible 
threshold of tolerability.136 
 
Suburbs were planned, and here again, “[t]he idea of the ‘bare 
minimum’ was no less in evidence. Suburban houses and ‘new 
towns’ came close to the lowest possible threshold of 
sociability—the point beyond which survival would be 
impossible because all social life would have disappeared.”137 
The allure of the rational further abstracted spatial 
distinctions and divisions. Zoning was chief among these tools, 
 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 316. 
137. Id. The history of suburbs in Europe differs in some European cities 
from the United States. In places such as Paris, high-rises of affordable 
housing projects predominate. However, what Europeans refer to as “new 
towns” are similar to typical American suburban communities both in spatial 
planning requirements, and the general sentiments that often prevail in 
those communities, including an automobile-oriented lifestyle. 
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with “[t]he assignment of functions, and the way functions are 
actually distributed ‘on the ground,’ becomes indistinguishable 
from the kind of analytical activity that discerns differences.”138 
These differences become tools for discrimination in the guise 
of rational judgment.139 In defiance of this abstraction, 
Lefebvre notes that, “The user’s space is lived not represented 
(or conceived). When compared with the abstract space of the 
experts (architects, urbanists, planners), the space of the 
everyday activities of users is a concrete one, which is to say, 
subjective.”140 
Lefebvre’s ire falls upon the rise of the planning tradition, 
with its emphasis on the abstracting tools of comprehensive 
plans, general plans, and zoning. With these tools, so much of 
life was reduced to their basic functions—or uses—and each 
prescribed a size, with dimensions defined by setbacks and 
other highly technical rationale for an orderly city. These tools 
 
138. Id. at 317. 
139. Id. at 318. 
 
     Abstract space is thus repressive in essence and par 
excellence—but thanks to its versatility it is repressive in a 
peculiarly artful way: its intrinsic repressiveness may be 
manifested alternatively through reduction, through 
(functional) localization, through the imposition of hierarchy 
and segregation - or through art. The fact of viewing from 
afar, of contemplating what has been torn apart, of 
arranging ‘viewpoints’ and ‘perspectives’, [sic] can (in the 
most favourable [sic] cases) change the effects of a strategy 
into aesthetic objects. Such art objects, though generally 
abstract, which is to say non-figurative, nevertheless play a 
figurative role in that they are truly admirable 
representations of a ‘surrounding’ space that effectively kills 
the surroundings. All of this corresponds only too well to 
that urbanism of maquettes and overall plans which is the 
perfect complement to the planning of sewers and public 
works: the creator’s gaze lights at will and to his heart’s 
content on ‘volumes’; but this is a fake lucidity, one which 
misapprehends both the social practice of the ‘users’ and the 
ideology that it itself enshrines. None of which prevents it in 
the slightest degree from presiding over the spectacle, and 
forging the unity into which all the programmed fragments 
must be integrated, no matter what the cost. 
 
Id. 
140. Id. at 362. 
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inevitably became the basis for discrimination. For instance, 
the hierarchy of uses in traditional zoning schemes prioritized 
single-family homes and thus placed apartment buildings, and 
thus large sections of the population, typically poor, next to 
industrial uses that exposed them to health risks.141 Similarly, 
definitions of appropriate neighborhoods for mortgage loans 
turned on factors like the prevalence of rental units in a 
neighborhood or the prevalence of racial diversity, which were 
deemed “risk factors,” and thus prevented minorities from 
accessing mortgages and further exacerbated segregation of the 
races.142 
In recognition of these logistical and social failures of 
traditional zoning structures, an increasing number of 
jurisdictions are experimenting with visual codes that regulate 
only the form of the built environment, but not its use. The 
radical proposition of these codes should not be 
underestimated, for they do something law has loathed to do: 
place the visual at center of the law of cities. In these new 
visual codes, while accompanied by text, it is often the visual 
diagram itself that conveys the regulations that define 
proposed development. 
A vivid contemporary example of this new effort to address 
the vices of abstraction are the codes developed by the City and 
County of San Francisco for a major development to occur on 
Treasure Island (a small island connected to the City and 
Oakland by bridges and located in San Francisco Bay). 
Treasure Island was long a Navy site.143 When the Navy closed 
operations there in 1997,144 Treasure Island was transferred 
from the Navy to the City of San Francisco for $105 million145 
 
141. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND 
USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 4.3(C) (2007). 
142. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 197-203 (1985) (discussing “red-lining”). 
143. Former Naval Station Treasure Island, U.S. NAVAL FACILITIES 
ENG’G COMMAND, http://www.bracpmo.navy.mil/basepage.aspx?baseid=44 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
144. Id. 
145. John Cote, City to Get Treasure Island for $105 Million, S.F. 
CHRON. (Dec. 17, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/12/16/BA6R1B5BR3.DTL; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of Navy BRAC Program Mgmt. Off. W., Navy and City of San Francisco 
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and an agreement signed in 2010.146 
The City has proposed to develop the island in one master 
plan. The proposed fifteen-year development147 is essentially a 
new town including: up to 8,000 homes, 140,000 square feet of 
commercial space, and 100,000 square feet of office space; three 
hotels; a marina and ferry service to San Francisco; and three 
hundred acres of parks and open space.148 
In preparing planning codes for this project, the City 
developed a skeleton planning code text that was accompanied 
by a massive set of drawings entitled the “Treasure Island + 
Yerba Buena Island Design for Development” (“Design for 
Development”) plan, which was specifically incorporated into 
the San Francisco Planning Code.149 Further, the City’s 
Planning Code specifically stated that development in the 
special use district governing Treasure Island “shall be 
regulated by the controls contained [in the Planning Code] and 
in the Design for Development . . . .”150 The zoning designations 
in the Code refer back to the Design for Development 
designations and images;151 the “tidelands trust” designating 
public trust lands is delineated in drawings in Design for 
 
Agree to Treasure Island Conveyance Terms (Dec. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.bracpmo.navy.mil/base_docs/treasure_island/documents/press_rel
eases/BRAC_PMO_TreasureIsland_release_v16DEC1630.pdf. 
146. John Cote & Rachel Gordon, Deal on Transfer of Treasure Island, 
S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 18, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/08/17/BA851EVGB7.DTL. 
147. See TREASURE IS. DEV. AUTH., DISPOSITION AND DEVELOPMENT 
AGREEMENT, EXHIBIT JJ (2011), available at 
http://www.sftreasureisland.org/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=10
56. 
148. Treasure Island Development Highlights, CITY & CNTY. OF S.F. 
TREASURE IS. DEV. AUTH., 
http://www.sftreasureisland.org/index.aspx?page=361 (last visited Oct. 17, 
2012). 
149. S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 249.52(d) (2011), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/California/planning/planningcode?f=
templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:sanfrancisco_ca$sync=1; 
TREASURE IS. DEV. AUTH., TREASURE ISLAND AND YERBA BUENA ISLAND DESIGN 
FOR DEVELOPMENT (2011) [hereinafter DESIGN FOR DEVELOPMENT], available at 
http://sftreasureisland.org/ftp/devdocs/D4D/12282011_FinalTI%20D4D(Date0
6282011).pdf. 
150. PLANNING § 249.52(e). 
151. Id. § 249.52(e)(1). 
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Development;152 interim uses must be consistent with Design 
for Development;153 height is measured as provided in Design 
for Development;154 tower bulk massing is described by 
diagrams in Design for Development;155 historic resources are 
designated and their treatment specified in Design for 
Development;156 and building permits must be consistent with 
Design for Development.157 In short, every significant aspect of 
the planning of this monstrous project will refer back, at least 
in part, to a code that has, at its core, a set of illustrated 
diagrams that convey essential information about the form of 
the development. Further, the Code also limits the Planning 
Director’s ability to approve or disapprove of a project to the 
“qualitative Standards and Guidelines” of Design for 
Development.158 A Development Agreement, which binds both 
the City and the developer, underscores Design for 
Development, and prevents the Planning Commission from 
imposing conditions of approval that conflict with Design for 
Development.159 As such, the Design for Development 
document is, more than any text, a true picture of what is to be 
built—or more accurately, what must be built, if anything is to 
be built at all—than any text could provide. (See Figure 3). 
How will the law respond to placing the visual at the core 
of the legal code? Despite the increasing prevalence of such 
visual codes, there has been no significant litigation of a visual 
code at this writing.160 While the law of cities has canons of 
construction to interpret texts, it has no such canons for 
making sense of the visual. It is hard to imagine that a case 
alleging vagueness, or ambiguity, or some violation of a due 
 
152. Id. § 249.52(e)(1). 
153. Id. § 249.52(e)(4). 
154. Id. § 249.52(e)(6)(A). 
155. Id. § 249.52(e)(6)(C); DESIGN FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 149, § 
Y4.5.5, at 261. 
156. PLANNING § 249.52(g)(5)(D). 
157. Id. § 249.52(g)(6). 
158. Id. § 249.52(g)(4)(C). 
159. Id. § 249.52(g)(4)(D)(ii). 
160. In a review of state and federal cases conducted on July 16, 2012, 
there was only an ancillary mention that there was an application for form-
based code in Litman v. Toll Bros., Inc., 263 F. App’x 269, 271(4th Cir. 2008), 
which turned on a real estate dispute. 
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process right, is not inevitable. At that time, the courts will 
have to decide whether the visual can accurately convey law in 
a manner that meets the constitutional and statutory 
requirements for regulations, or whether the visual shall 
remain disfavored in the eyes of the law. 
Beyond the visual’s ability to convey legal standards in a 
manner that meets such constitutional and statutory 
requirements, the law of cities must evaluate whether these 
new visual codes succeed in addressing the challenges to place-
making proffered by Sennett,161 legal geography,162 and 
Lefebvre.163 Do visual codes, in any manner, advance questions 
of diversity, do they advance the need to place the individual in 
context, or are these visual codes simply another form of 
zoning’s abstractions already created? Treasure Island’s codes 
are instructive. The basis for residential plans is still the unit; 
the spaces are still segregated by uses; and the uses are 
regulated by zoning classifications. These basic tenets of 
space’s abstraction to which Lefebvre objected remain. But the 
Treasure Island visual codes do add specificity to the planning 
experience, and moreover, that specificity is aimed at seeking a 
human scale. Drawings that convey legally actionable setback 
requirements feature people in them walking their dogs. 
Renderings of the experience on the street, rather than the 
view of the structures from on high, dominate the Treasure 
Island’s codes. These may be simply the visual’s equivalent of 
rhetorical devices to smooth over planning’s fundamental 
abstractions of space; however, by simply lowering the angle of 
view to the street from on high, the Treasure Island code offers 
a chance to speculate about the development’s future as a lived 
experience rather than as an architect’s, or a planner’s, 
conception. If we presume that such projects, and the scale of 
such projects, are inevitable in this era, then the use of visual 
codes may be simply the best approach available to ensure the 
perspective of the individual—the city as lived experience—is 
the primary objective of the planning process. 
 
 
161. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21. 
162. See supra notes 1252-31 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 3. Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island Design for 
Development164 
 
VI. Fourth Tableau: Representation of Space and Edward 
Hopper 
 
“Many are the cities . . . which elude the gaze of all, except the 
man who catches them by surprise.” 165–Italo Calvino 
 
In this final tableau, the article turns to the relation 
between the law of cities and the visual arts. In a sense, the 
turn to the visual arts is a natural extension of the law and 
literature movement. Peter Brooks has written: 
 
The law and literature movement has arisen in 
large part from those who believe that law needs 
to be accountable to more than itself, to more 
than the legal institution, its languages and 
rituals. It needs to be tested against the realm of 
human value to which literature speaks—not in 
any simple sense of moral uplift but in its 
 
164. DESIGN FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 149, at 271. 
165. ITALO CALVINO, INVISIBLE CITIES 24 (William Weaver trans., 1974) 
(1972). 
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address to the human condition.”166 
 
Perhaps more than literature, though, the visual arts generally 
and especially paintings focusing on cities as subjects, can play 
a similar role for the law of cities because what this body of law 
produces and regulates is so tangible: the place in which we 
live, which is physical. In considering the role that the visual 
arts can play for the law of cities, this article will first seek to 
explore the nature of landscape painting, its choices and 
rhetorics, as analyzed by philosopher Edward Casey, before 
turning to the paintings of Edward Hopper, as an example of 
how the visual arts can dialogue with the law of cities. 
Casey starts from the premise that “[t]he problem of 
representing landscape can be seen as a quandary of 
containment.”167 The experience the landscape painter seeks to 
portray goes beyond what could ever be adequately presented 
on the canvas, both in size and also in feeling.168 As Casey puts 
it, “How can the decisively determinate [of the picture frame] 
contain the inestimably indeterminate?”169 As a result, 
“[p]ainterly representations are genuine presentations. They 
seek to present, not to represent; they strive to show, not to 
replicate.”170 Casey argues that the landscape painting is not 
merely a recordation of a particular scene, but rather the 
landscape painter using memory of the entire region in order to 
present the “placial specificity and felt vicinage.”171 Casey 
argues further: 
 
To know a region is to be fully acquainted with it 
as it is spread out in space (i.e., as visible from 
“numerous angles”) and as it is distended in time 
 
166. Peter Brooks, Literature as Law’s Other, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 
349, 356 (2010). 
167. EDWARD S. CASEY, REPRESENTING PLACE: LANDSCAPE PAINTING & 
MAPS 7 (2002) (emphasis in original). 
168. See id. (“[T]he issue is how something that, by its very nature, 
overflows ordinary perception can be represented by something else that, by 
its very nature, can only present itself to the viewer as a discrete object with 
definite dimensions and often within a delimited frame.”) 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 18. 
171. Id. at 75. 
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/5
MILLER Final 2/28/2013 10:36 PM 
2013] THE VISUAL AND THE LAW OF CITIES 223 
(i.e., as it changes “over time”). . . . To know a 
region is also to be able to remember it. . . . More 
important still is the fact that only through 
memory is knowledge of an entire region 
sustained. We encounter here a quite 
fundamental condition of representability, a 
condition of painting any landscape that conveys 
more than a momentary glimpse of its layout. 
Confronted with the spatially and temporally 
expansive character of a given region, a 
landscape painter draws upon his or her memory 
of numerous experiences of that region in order 
to hold together otherwise disparate 
experiences—and to be adequate to the 
complexity of the region itself.172 
 
The painter then uses these multiple experiences and histories 
of experience in the region to put into one painting the 
experience of the entirety of that place.173 The particulars of the 
painting—rocks, trees, streets, what have you—are not simply 
representations of a specific place, but of the region itself.174 As 
such, the physical objects in landscape painting can have their 
shape varied by apparent size, position, and the shape and size 
of the canvas.175 
 
172. Id. at 76. 
173. Id. at 81. 
 
Just as it is possible to remember the same thing but in 
different ways—for example, with varying emotional 
tonalities—so the painter of a region may render the leading 
features of its constituent places in various versions. These 
versions reinstate one and the same scene, a given haunt, as 
it presents itself in several acts of perceiving as well as in 
the history of the painter’s remembrances. 
 
Id.; see also id. at 89 (“The place at stake in regional re-implacement cannot 
be reduced to position or ‘simple location.’”); id. at 90 (“To capture the 
sublimity of a natural scene, the landscape painter must anchor experience 
and memory and imagination in representations that are as place-specific as 
they are region-reflective.”). 
174. Id. at 82. 
175. Id. at 83-84. 
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Edward Hopper illustrates Casey’s vision of how paintings 
work with space, and also how the law of cities and the visual 
arts can speak to each other. Hopper was one of the twentieth 
century’s great “realist” painters, so labeled because he did not 
indulge in the decade’s more popular schools of abstraction.176 
His prolific work spanned the century’s first six decades and 
focused primarily on city street scenes in New York City; 
however, he also painted rural street scenes, railroads, 
lighthouses in Maine, and rural scenes near his summer house 
near Truro, Massachusetts, on Cape Cod, and around 
Gloucester, Massachusetts.177 He painted where he lived, and 
occasionally, where he travelled, such as Paris in his early 
years, as well as on later trips to the American South and 
West.178 
Hopper’s method of painting was evocative of Casey’s 
notion that the landscape artist is not simply representing a 
particular landscape, but instead interpreting the landscape 
through the artist’s personal understanding of the larger 
region. Some art critics during Hopper’s life viewed his work 
essentially as photography.179 From early in Hopper’s career up 
to this day, a cottage industry has emerged trying to find the 
exact location and angle of Hopper’s paintings. While some 
locations can be found that are remarkably similar to Hopper’s 
paintings, there is always a variation—sometimes small, 
 
176. See GAIL LEVIN, EDWARD HOPPER: AN INTIMATE BIOGRAPHY 187 
(1995) [hereinafter HOPPER BIOGRAPHY]. Levin’s book is far-and-away the 
most influential, and most-cited biography of Hopper, and so is used 
extensively for biographical information in this article. 
177. See generally id. 
178. Id. at 48-70 (Paris), 221-22 (Charleston, S.C.), 190-93 (Sante Fe, 
N.M.), 337-42 (American West). 
179. HOPPER BIOGRAPHY, supra note 176, at 396. Clement Greenberg, 
who had championed the Abstract Expressionists, wrote in the Nation that  
 
Hoppers painting is essentially photography, and it is 
literary in the way that the best photography is. Like 
Walker Evans’s and Weegee’s art, it triumphs over 
inadequacies of the physical medium. . . . Hopper simply 
happens to be a bad painter. But if he were a better painter, 
he would, most likely, not be so superior an artist. 
 
Id. 
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sometimes large—between what is there in real life, and what 
is there in Hopper’s painting.180 In a telling anecdote, John 
Maass, discovered two houses in Haverstraw, just north of 
Nyack, New York, and wrote to Hopper in the mid-1950s to 
inquire about the exact location of the house that appears in 
Hopper’s 1925 House by the Railroad.181 Jo, Hopper’s wife, 
responded to Maass, “[h]e did it out of his head. He has seen so 
many of them.”182 This was not unusual for Hopper, who 
routinely painted indoors and from memory, but always based 
upon an intense study of his subject region.183 
As Casey proposed of landscape painters generally, Hopper 
long maintained that the purpose of painting, even of 
landscapes of seemingly recognizable locations, was primarily 
one of expressing an artist’s interior thoughts and feelings.184 
In one of his few statements on the nature of art, Hopper 
wrote: 
 
Great art is the outward expression of an inner 
life in the artist, and this inner life will result in 
his personal vision of the world. No amount of 
skillful invention can replace the essential 
element of imagination. One of the weaknesses of 
much abstract painting is the attempt to 
 
180. See, e.g., Gail Albert Halaban, The Original Hoppers, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE (July 20, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/07/22/magazine/hopper-houses.html 
(comparing Hopper paintings and photographs of subjects of same). 
181. HOPPER BIOGRAPHY, supra note 176, at 195. 
182. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
183. Id. at 371. Jo, writing of Hopper’s painting in Provincetown: 
 
He cares only for the common denominator in houses, roads, 
etc. & is not beguiled by so much individuality. He no longer 
cares to work out from the thing, wants only to make 
sketches here & there & compare his own subjects in the 
studio which is much more comfortable, heaven knows. We 
know all about working in a cold wind or with mosquitoes or 
knats [sic] or nosee-ums plagueing [sic] the life out of one, & 
the publicity of working out too is so distracting, 
insufferable for E[dward]. 
 
Id. 
184. See id. at 438. 
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substitute the inventions of the intellect for a 
pristine imaginative conception. The inner life of 
a human being is a vast and varied realm and 
does not concern itself alone with stimulating 
arrangements of color, form, and design.185 
 
Rather, Hopper maintained that abstraction, whether in 
painting or in life, leads us away from the specificity of our 
being and the need to engage with that environment. Hopper 
wrote: 
 
There is a school of painting called abstractionist 
or non objective which is derived largely from the 
work of Paul Cézanne, that attempts to create 
“pure painting” that is, an art which will use 
form, color and design for their own sakes, and 
independent of man’s experience of life and his 
association with nature. I do not believe such an 
aim can be achieved by a human being. Whether 
we wish it or not we are all bound to the earth 
with our experience of life and the reactions of 
the mind, heart, and eye, and our sensations, by 
no means, consist entirely of form, color and 
design. We would be leaving out a great deal that 
I consider worth while [sic] expressing in 
painting, and it can not [sic] be expressed in 
literature.186 
 
For these same reasons, the law of cities must find ways to 
connect with the visual arts as other aspects of the law have 
with literature. The experience of place is physical, and when 
reduced to words, descriptions of places become subject to the 
tropes, conventions, and expectations of written word. Notably, 
we ask whether it is fiction or non-fiction, whether there is a 
narrative thread, whether the story is compelling. In that way, 
we turn away in literature from the place itself to evaluate the 
art of the text. The law of cities deserves a relationship with an 
 
185. Id. at 460. 
186. Id. at 401. 
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art that seeks to represent the physical in a manner in which 
we primarily experience it: through the visual. To be a dialogue 
of use to the law of cities, though, that art cannot simply re-
present the city as it is, for the law of cities is already 
inundated with evidence of the city of how it is in maps, 
technical drawings and the like. What Casey posits, and 
Hopper seconds, is that it is the visual artist’s use of memory 
and internalization of a location that permits the visual artist 
to present a place more truly than the place could ever present 
itself in life or on a map. It is that sense of place that the visual 
arts provides to the law of cities—the ability to dialogue with 
the place in a way that is not on a map or a title description—
that speaks to, and adds richness to, the place that is bound by 
legal description. 
Hopper saw this at work in small ways, and in big terms. 
He was long considered an “American” painter187 and as 
embodying the “American Scene,”188 but these descriptions also 
 
187. Id. at 494. Hopper said for a Time cover story in 1956,  
 
The thing that makes me so mad is the “American Scene” 
business . . . I never tried to do the American scene as 
Benton and Curry and the midwestern painters did. I think 
the American Scene painters caricatured America. I always 
wanted to do myself. The French painters didn’t talk about 
the “French Scene,” or the English painters the “English 
scene.” 
 
Id. 
188. Id. at 234. In the March, 1927 edition of The Arts, Lloyd Goodrich 
referred to Hopper as an “eminently native painter,” and stated, “It is hard to 
think of another painter who is getting more of the quality of America into 
his canvases than Edward Hopper.” Id. at 203. Levin writes: 
 
The call for an authentic American art had already sounded 
in Emerson’s essay, “Self-Reliance,” which Hopper would 
cite in his next major essay on an American artist: An why 
need we copy the Doric or the Gothic model? Beauty, 
convenience, grandeur of thought and quaint expression are 
as near to us as to any, and if the American artist will study 
with hope and love the precise thing to be done by him, 
considering the climate, the soil, the length of the day, the 
wants of the people, the habit and form of the government, 
he will create a house in which all these will find 
themselves fitted, and taste and sentiment will be satisfied 
also. 
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bothered him precisely because it was a nationalistic 
abstraction, and belied the specificity of individual places that 
he thought should have priority, and to which his work paid 
homage. Hopper wrote, in preparation for a show: 
 
I hope though that in the publicity to be given 
this show there will be no reference to the 
“American Scene.” . . . 
If one looks out of one’s window in Ohio, 
Massachusetts, or California, and reports 
honestly what one sees and feels with one’s 
personal vision of the world in command, that 
will be one’s interpretation of the American 
scene. It is part of our daily existence. Even the 
mystics can not [sic] ignore it.189 
 
Out of these two aspects of Hopper—the filtering of the 
environment through his interior and personal experience and 
his commitment to the particular scene—a dialogue between 
the visual arts and the law of cities emerges. For one of the 
perpetual dilemmas in the law of cities is for whom the law 
exists. For some, the overarching concern is property rights, 
and the desire to maintain those rights. But if such a legal 
regime begins to approach a Hopper painting, it must contend 
with a very personal reaction and interpretation of the city 
found in a Hopper work. Independent of the question of 
property rights—highly abstract concepts—the city is the space 
of life where individual subjects, like Hopper, seek a personal 
vision of the world in their environment. The law of cities, to 
the extent it purports to defend anything of individual liberties, 
has to take into account how to address this personal vision 
and the interior life of those whose lives go on in the midst of 
law’s abstractions. 
To further evaluate these concepts, the remainder of this 
tableau will focus on several ways in which Hopper specifically 
engaged with the evolution of cities. Hopper lived on 
 
 
Id. at 204-05. 
189. Id. at 480. 
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Washington Square Park in New York City190 at a time when it 
was transitioning from a square dominated by residential 
buildings reminiscent of the gilded era of Henry James 
novels,191 to its modern incarnation, dominated by mid-rise 
skyscrapers. At the center of the transition was New York 
University, which Hopper fought on both its larger ambitions 
as well as its efforts to remove Hopper from his home on the 
square.192 
Two aspects of this dispute are especially evident in 
Hopper’s painting and relevant to the law of cities: the scale of 
cities and the transformation of a neighborhood. Skyscrapers 
are notably absent from most of Hopper’s paintings, especially 
for a painter of New York City in the first half of the twentieth 
century. When present, skyscrapers are often in the distance 
and typically cutting a jagged hole in an otherwise fully formed 
and human-scaled city scene. A classic example is The City, a 
painting in which Hopper took a cinematic bird’s-eye view of 
Washington Square Park, then an elegant array of 
brownstones and mansard roof-topped buildings, but also 
portrayed in the distance, a skyscraper looms, cut off by the top 
of the frame.193 The painting represents Hopper’s ambivalent 
attitude towards skyscrapers, as well as the changing face of 
the twentieth century generally.194 Hopper considered 
 
190. Id. at 247. 
191. See, e.g., HENRY JAMES, WASHINGTON SQUARE (1880). 
192. HOPPER BIOGRAPHY, supra note 176, at 395. 
193. Id. at 201. 
 
He shared the climate of opinion that would find voice in 
critics like Lewis Mumford, who soon published articles 
with such titles as “Is the Skyscraper Tolerable?” and 
“Botched Cities.” For them, the skyscraper represented 
everything that was wrong with modern urban America, 
from the superficiality of material values to the increased 
standardization of life. 
 
Id. 
194. Id. at 229. 
 
He rarely represented skyscrapers at all, and when he did, 
he reduced them to fragmentary glimpses or intrusions on 
the cityscape. . . . His recurrent visual ironies on the 
manifestations of modern life suggest his highly ambivalent 
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American Victorian architecture the country’s native style, and 
his sentiments allied with Henry James, who argued that 
skyscrapers “never begin to speak to you, in the manner of the 
builded [sic] majesties of the world as we have heretofore 
known such–towers or fortresses or palaces—with the 
authority of things of permanence or even of things of long 
duration.”195 
From the contemporary perspective, given over to 
skyscrapers, Hopper’s perspective can appear quaint, dated, 
even conservative. But it is also evocative of something that 
happens all the time in cities: changes of use and changes of 
scale. Such changes, such as the arrival of skyscrapers on 
Washington Square, can be viewed as a matter of property 
rights, or as a matter of newly available building materials, or 
as an evolution of taste and style. But Hopper’s position is 
indicative of a perspective that is almost always undervalued 
by the law of cities: the perspective of the person whose life is 
changing, whose neighborhood is disappearing. Hopper’s 
tension with skyscrapers in his paintings gives the law of cities 
a chance to imagine the perspective of a person whose 
neighborhood is lost and will soon be gone. Such perspectives 
are also evident in Hopper’s 1932 painting City Roofs, in which 
Hopper painted a view from the rooftop of his studio. 
“[P]artially visible on the back right side of the canvas is a pale 
yellow skyscraper recently built at One Fifth Avenue.”196 Its 
imposing scale tells a similar story of the evolution of cities, 
and the sense of loss Hopper felt for the older, smaller scale of 
the neighborhood. 
The resulting effects of the law of cities are, in fact, a city. 
Paintings of specific locations, as Casey notes, are 
representations not just of a scene of the city, but are intended 
to evoke the broader experience of the city or region: what 
 
attitude toward the changes occurring in the twentieth-
century society; it is his profound alienation from 
contemporary life that makes his art so characteristic of 
modernity itself. 
 
Id. 
195. Id. at 279-80. 
196. HOPPER BIOGRAPHY, supra note 176, at 247. 
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Hopper painted of Washington Square was true of all 
Manhattan, not to mention most urban American cities of the 
time. A dialogue with such paintings does not directly affect 
any right to develop, but it does bring to question the effects of 
development on individuals who live in cities. As Lefebvre 
noted, it is the lived space that ultimately matters most to the 
individual, because it is the location of experience.197 Planning 
for dwelling units, for housing units, reducing vehicle miles 
traveled, or whatever the planning regime may proffer—not to 
mention the abstractions of individual property rights—all may 
fail to acknowledge that cities are not just machines for living, 
but for the living of individual lives. 
A dialogue with the visual arts is a step toward softening 
the hard film of abstraction that accretes when the law of cities 
plans the future. The question emerges: should the law of cities 
incorporate experience with visual arts into law itself? Even if 
law remains textual in its form, as it is likely to do in 
substantial part, the law of cities benefits from engaging with 
lived experience, as does any aspect of law. When the law of 
cities engages with how cities are lived, we come closer to 
building legal regimes that build places that feel like home. If 
literature is generally law’s other, as Peter Brooks posits,198 we 
may go one step further here: the visual arts are equally the 
other of the law of cities, each entwined and enmeshed in the 
other’s vision of itself. For though a walk outside can give one 
impression of the city, the visual arts that focus on cities, can 
provide an image that contains more, as Casey would say, than 
a walk along all of the city streets could ever do. And while the 
essence of a city—even an essence of diversity, especially an 
essence of diversity—will never find its way into law directly 
from a painting, the law of cities should strive to maintain 
what its inhabitants seek for it to be. Paintings, such as those 
of Hopper, offer a window into what a place is that the law of 
cities necessitates. 
 
 
 
 
197. See supra text accompanying note 138. 
198. See supra text accompanying note 166. 
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VII.Conclusion 
 
At first blush, it is arguable for some that the role of the 
visual in the law of cities is narrow, perhaps even esoteric, with 
regard to other concerns. Against such claims, one need only 
recall the vast distances covered here: the cultural and legal 
value of maps, the legal role of aesthetics in building cities, the 
production of space through the abstractions of zoning and 
planning, and the role of the visual arts in informing the law of 
cities. Drawn in such relief, the questions of the visual in the 
law of cities emerge from the incidental, and law’s general 
inattention to the visual begins to seem inexcusable. 
A blind statue of justice makes clear the law’s general 
preference that the visual be excommunicated from the law’s 
work. Above all else, the tableaux of this article illustrate that 
the visual and the law of cities are inextricably linked. To the 
extent the general legal bias against the visual is applied in the 
law of cities, such bias obscures the law of cities’ ability to see 
clearly its own functions and the role of the visual in them. 
Such blindness is not without danger. As the first two 
tableaux on diseños and aesthetics revealed, cultural biases are 
often embedded in the visual. As the last two tableaux on the 
production and representation of space revealed, the relative 
abstraction of legal regimes can belittle, even hide, the 
experience and needs of the individual. Acknowledging, and 
openly confronting, the role of the visual in the law of cities 
makes it more likely that the law will adequately address the 
potential problems associated with the visual that may arise in 
the quotidian functioning of legal practice, while also 
permitting the visual to provide more powerful tools, and a 
richer exchange of ideas, about the values and choice 
undergirding how the law of cities guides the development of 
where we live. 
Teaching the law of cities to see the visual does not re-
write any law outright, but does make the law of cities more 
honest in its machinations, and brings into the discussion an 
approach to the visual of cities beyond aesthetics, one that 
embraces the visual as the “other” of the law of cities. This asks 
of more than beauty to inquire in detailed ways how a city 
becomes a home for its inhabitants, and how inhabitants 
50http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/5
MILLER Final 2/28/2013 10:36 PM 
2013] THE VISUAL AND THE LAW OF CITIES 233 
respond and reflect upon changes in the city, such as the city’s 
inevitable changes in scale and use. These are several ways the 
visual is uniquely qualified to assist the law of cities achieve its 
ends. With continued dialogue on this subject, more uses of the 
visual in the law of cities are certain to emerge and further the 
creation of cities that evince what Wallace Stegner once called 
a “sense of place.”199 
 
199. See generally WALLACE STEGNER, THE SENSE OF PLACE (1986). 
51
